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The dissent suggested that the legality of decedent's employ-
ment status was not unchallengeable: "[Wihen he contracted to
do private work for a private individual, in a legal sense he ceased
to act as the superintendent of highways .. and thus lost his
status as an employee.'
But the majority found on the authority of Dann v. Town of
Veteran 7 that the illegality of the work contract did not affect the
validity of decedent's employment for purposes of Workmen's
Compensation, distinguishing Clarke v. Town of Russia s on
grounds that the employment contract in that case was illegal in
its inception.
Aggravation of Injuries
In Sullivan v. B & A Const., Inc.,,9 claimant had previously
suffered two compensable injuries to his right knee, as a result
of which his knee occasionally "locked" so that he was tempo-
rarily deprived of use of his right leg. The court unanimously
held ° that injuries suffered in an automobile accident wherein
claimant's knee locked so that he was unable to apply the brake,
were not compensable.
Claimant admitted that his knee had locked several times
previously while he was driving. It was found that although the
accident almost certainly would not have occurred but for the
original knee injuries, the chain of causation was broken by claim-
ant's own act of driving despite knowledge of his disability and
the hazards involved.2'
There has been some conflict of authority as to whether the
prior compensable injury must be the "proximate" cause of the
subsequent injury, or merely a "but for" cause. A substantial
15. 307 N. Y. at 432, 121 N. E. 2d at 405.
16. A contract between a municipality and one of its officers is against public
policy and is illegal. Beebe v. Supervisors of Sullivan County, 64 Hun 377, aff'd 142
N. Y. 631, 37 N. E. 566 (1894). Such a contract is wholly void, not merely voidable.
Clarke v. Town of Russia, supra, note 14; 10 McQui.wN, MUNxicrPAL CoaRoATIots
(3d ed. 1949), 196-197. A compensation award was not be based on a void, illegal con-
tract. Su4hura v. Horowitz, 242 N. Y. 523, 152 N. E. 411 (1926); Herbold v. Neff,
200 App. Div. 244, 193 N. Y. Supp. 244 (3d Dep't 1922).
17. Supra, note 13. It may be noteworthy that in the Dann case coverage was
specifically provided for claimant by name in the insurance contract.
18. Supra, note 14.
19. 307 N. Y. 161, 120 N. E. 2d 694 (1954).
20. Reversing 282 App. Div. 788, 122 N. Y. S. 2d 571 (3d Dep't 1953), which
had unanimously upheld an award by the Workmen's Compensation Board.
21, For the same rule in other jurisdictions, see, 1 LARSON;, WORYMEN'S COMPEN-
SATOiN LAW 183-184 (1952), and Note, 102 A. L. R. 790 (1936).
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number of cases support the Sullivan finding;2 but it has been
held that it is immaterial that a claimant's negligence contributed
to the injury.2 Other cases have found that the intervention of
independent variables such as slipping and stumbling would not
bar recovery.24
This view has been expressed in terms of the presence of two
or more concurrent proximate causes ;25 and it is thought that so
long as the original injury contributed materially to the eventual
disability, negligence would not necessarily constitute such an in-
tervening variable as to break the chain of causation.
26
Colvin v. Emmons & Whitehead=7 is the leading case in this
jurisdiction holding that negligence of the employee is no bar
to recovery for subsequent injuries. That case has been criticized
on the ground that it failed to distinguish between the abolition
of contributory negligence as a defense against recovery for the
initial injury, and the situation where recovery is sought for ag-
gravation of an earlier compensable injury.28 But the Colvin
decision may spring from a more basic deviation; it would appear
that the court there deliberately chose to extend the effect of the
statute to free claimants from the defense of negligence even with
reference to such subsequent injuries. The Sullivan case refused
to so bxtend this abrogation of the common law, and thus impliedly
overruled.Colvin, though without reference to that case. It should
22. E. g., Brown v. New York St. Training School, 285 N. Y. 37, 32 N. E. 2d
783 (1941). Decedent mistakenly swallowed poison tablet instead of pain-relieving tablet
prescribed for compensable injury. Held: Death not compensable, in absence of showing
of pain-induced derangement such as to cause fatal error. See also, Blackley v. Niagara
Roofing Co., 225 App. Div. 432, 233 N. Y. Supp. 376 (3d Dep't 1929). Held: Original
compensable injury, though it aggravated subsequent disability, did not cause claimant
to slip or stumble, re-injuring same member; Fischer v. R. Hoe & Co., Inc., 224 App.
Div. 335, 230 N. Y. Supp. 755 (3d Dep't 1928): Compensable finger injury was
bandaged with alcohol-soaked dressifig, which caught fire when claimant lit a cigarette.
Held: No causal connection established. Accord: Robbins v. Frohlich, 303 N. Y. 987,
106 N. E. 2d 65 (1952) ; Death due to pre-existing condition of delirium tremens while
under treatment for infected finger held not compensable; Board had granted award
on theory that the injury initiated the fatal attack.
23. Colvin v. Emmons & Whitehead, 216 App. Div. 577, 215 N. Y. Supp. 562 (3d
Dep't 1926): Totally disabled employee received award and later sustained fatal fall
from ladder due to attack of vertigo. Held: Decedent's indiscretion and negligence in
going upon the ladder constituted no defense.
24. Chiodo v. Newhall Co., 254 N. Y. 534, 173 N. E. 854 (1930); Prentice v.
Weeks, 239 App. Div. 227, 267 N. Y. Supp. 849 (3d Dep't 1933).
25. Anderson v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 256 N. Y. 146, 175 N. E. 654 (1931);
Murray v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 253 App. Div. 848, (3d Dep't 1938);
Phillips v. Holmes Express Co., 190 App. Div. 336, 179 N. Y. Supp. 400 (3d Dep't
1919), aff'd, 229 N. Y. 527, 129 N. E. 902 (1919).
26. Swanson v. Williams & Co., 278 App. Div. 477, 106 N. Y. S. 2d 61 (3d Dep't
1951). Accord, McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N. Y. 221, 94 N. E. 616
(1911), particularly concurring opinion by Vann, J.
27. Supra, note 23.
28. See Note, 38 CORNEL L. Q. 99-104 (1952).
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be noted that the Sullivan decision is in harmony with the great
weight of authority in other jurisdictions.'
Intermittent Employment
Workmen's Compensation Law § 203 provides: "Employees
in employment of a covered employer for four or more consecutive
weeks shall be eligible for disability benefits as provided in section
two hundred four."
In Russomanno v. Leon Decorating Co.,s° a painter had worked
for several employers for varying periods of time, but in no event
did he work for one employer for the statutory minimum of four
consecutive weeks. The court held"1 that his injury, sustained in
the course of employment, was not compensable, despite evidence
that he was ready and willing to work steadily, and that the in-
termittent nature of his employment was in accordance with the
pattern of the trade.
The Appellate Division had affirmed an award on the ground
that claimant was "in employment" for the required period in
the sense that he was available for work in accordance with trade
practice.3 2 But the Court of Appeals rejected this reasoning, rely-
ing on the "plain meaning" of the statute.
The effect of this decision is to exclude from coverage many
workmen whose employment is intermittent. 3 The court found
this unobjectionable, in view of the fact that there are several
other exclusions found in the statute ;84 but it may be questioned
whether the obviously remedial intent of the statute is best served
by the strict construction adopted by the court.
29. !id.
30. 306 N. Y. 521, 119 N. E. 2d 367 (1954).
31. Conway and Dye, JJ., dissenting, and following the Appellate Division decision,
infra, nbte 32.
32. 282 App. Div. 18, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 732 (3d Dep't 1953). The decision relied
on Regulation 52(b), promulgated by the Board, which provides for eligibility when
"in employment during the work period usual to and available during such four consecu-
tive weeks in any trade or business in which he is regularly employed and in which
hiring from day to day of such employees is the usual employment practice." But the
Court of Appeals refused to construe the regulation: ". . . Whatever be its full mean-
ing and bearing, it cannot overrule the statute itself and we assume it was not intended
to do so." Supra, note 30 at 525, 119 N. E. 2d at 369.
33. Such factors as weather, hiring practices, and nature of work could limit the
possibility of steady employment in many cases; thus the benefits of the statute might
be seriously restricted. This was pointed out in the Appellate Division, supra, note 32
at 19, 121 N. Y. S. 2d at 734.
34. See WORKMEN'S COMPENSAT oN LAW § 201 <6).
